RSD-4 is the fourth in a series of posts on the restricted stock discount. This post addresses what valuation discounts (or premiums) are supposed to do, and then examines the restricted stock discount in the context of valuation ratios. In short, restricted stock discounts, or averages of them, cannot be used as valuation ratios for purposes of developing marketability discounts. This will be disquieting to many valuation analysts, but it is simply true.
This post is the third in a series on restricted stock discounts (RSDs). The first post provided some basic background on restricted stock discounts. The second addressed an important question: Why are the values of illiquid minority interests almost always lower than marketable minority values? This third post looks at restricted stock discounts in light of the guideline transactions method since business appraisers have tried to shoe-horn these discounts into a valuation method for many years.
This post addresses the question of why illiquid minority interests are almost always lower than the marketable minority values of underlying companies. The answer is rooted in valuation theory and has nothing to do with the existence of restricted stock discounts. The question is addressed in light of business valuation theory and, yes, in light of the Integrated Theory.
Five recent posts on this blog have addressed the topic of restricted stock discounts. At the risk of some overlap with earlier posts, we will restart the series in a more disciplined manner. The purpose of this series of posts is to highlight the fact that attempting to use averages of restricted stock studies as a basis for determining marketability discounts (or DLOMs, if you prefer) applicable to illiquid minority interests of private companies is not a valid valuation method. We will examine restricted stock discounts in light of valuation theory, business valuation standards, and common valuation practice. The ultimate conclusion is that the common usage of restricted stock discounts as a market approach for developing marketability discounts is flawed and that valuation analysts should consider methods under the income approach that consider the expected cash flows, growth and risks associated with receiving these benefits for illiquid minority interests in relationship to the marketable minority base values to which they are compared.
Business Valuation: An Integrated Theory, 3rd Edition has been published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. in the Wiley Finance Series. My co-author, Travis W. Harms, CFA, CPA/ABV and I are excited and relieved to have received this work in hand late last week. In this post, I will begin to tell the story about the book and why you should own it and read it.
Two readers of this blog provided good comments to my last post, #4 – The Myth of the 25% – 45% “Typical” Range of Restricted Stock Discounts Must Die. The discussion that these comments began is important for appraisers, so their comments and my responses constitute this fifth post in the series on restricted stock studies and discounts.
This is the third post in a series on restricted stock discounts. We address the economics of the expected holding period premium over public company issuer discount rates that causes the restricted stock discounts observed in restricted stock transactions. The only difference between public company shareholders and restricted stock purchasers is the period of enforced illiquidity enforced by SEC Rule 144. When appraisers estimate marketability discounts based on averages of dated restricted stock studies, what is the implied holding period and what is the implied holding period premium? If you can’t address those questions, you will have difficulty in sustaining the credibility of your concluded restricted stock discounts.
In the first article in this series on restricted stock discounts, we examined the Silber Study, which was published in 1991. In this post, we focus on the differences and similarities between restricted shares and freely traded shares of issuers of restricted stock to hone in on the expected holding period premium. This series should begin to change how you think about restricted stock discounts.