My musings on the use of restricted stock discounts to estimate marketability discounts (or DLOMs) have led me to the conclusion: Restricted stock studies/discounts cannot be used to estimate DLOMs in any credible, standards-compliant manner. This fifth post in the musings series takes a look at the usefulness of pre-IPO discounts in estimating marketability discounts.
Following “Mercer’s Musings” 1-3, Mercer’s Musing #4 examines the guidance found in “Procedural Guideline -2 (PG – 2) Valuation of Partial Ownership Interests” in the ASA Business Valuation Standards. Procedural Guidelines (PG) are designed to provide more detailed guidance for consideration by business appraisers than found in the base standards themselves.
There is a great deal more to valuing illiquid minority interests than “guessing” at a marketability discount based on vague references to dated and non-comparable restricted stock transactions or studies. All appraisers would be well-served to read PG – 2 Valuation of Partial Ownership Interests in the ASA Business Valuation Standards. Doing so should provide a different and more realistic view of the valuation of illiquid minority interests of private companies than is held by many appraisers.
In “Mercer’s Musings #2,” the focus shifts to the examination of restricted stock studies and their application in determining marketability discounts for gift and estate tax appraisals, offering valuable insights for appraisers across all credential spectrums. Highlighting the inherent challenges of such studies, I underscore the lack of economic relevance these studies hold in contemporary valuation scenarios, particularly emphasizing their disconnect with current private company valuations. Through an analysis and a hypothetical valuation scenario, I invite readers to explore the nuanced complexities of applying marketability discounts, advocating for a quantitative approach informed by common sense, judgment, and reasonableness.
Many years ago, I wrote a column for the Business Valuation Review that the editor, Jay Fishman, FASA, called “Mercer’s Musings.” In this blog and with this post, I reintroduce “Mercer’s Musings” because I would like to reflect on a number of seemingly unsettled issues in the business valuation world. This first musing relates to the need (or not) to comply with the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice promulgated by The Appraisal Foundation in gift and estate tax appraisals prepared for the Internal Revenue Service.
My co-author, Travis W. Harms, CFA, CPA/ABV, and I have been doggedly insisting that business valuation questions, issues, premiums, discounts, and more be viewed through the combined lens of expected cash flow, its expected growth, and the risks associated with achieving the expected cash flows.
Until the latter 1990s, it was thought that buyers of companies paid premiums (over publicly-traded prices of targets) for elements of control. The current view is that buyers of companies pay for expected changes, post-acquisition, in combined cash flows and potentially reduced risk. Unfortunately, the valuation literature appears slow to recognize this change in thinking from paying for control (or lack thereof) to paying for relevant value based on the expected cash flows of a business or an interest in a business from the viewpoints of market participants at the respective levels.
The failure of Silicon Valley Bank will be talked about for years. What really happened? What caused SVB to fail? Was it just the long-term Treasury securities that everyone has talked about? Well, no. SVB was on a self-imposed path to destruction that had been waiting for an adverse change in the economy or a rising interest rate environment to kick it into oblivion.
There are, indeed, lessons for family business directors from the failure of Silicon Valley Bank. In this week’s post, I discuss four.
This post examines two concepts, marketability and liquidity, or the lack of one or both in the context of fair market value determinations of controlling ownership interests of private companies.
This post provides a discussion of several implications of the definition of the standard of value known as fair market value. We focus first on the definition of fair market value. Next, we examine the hypothetical negotiations conducted by hypothetical buyers and sellers in fair market value determinations and the implications of those negotiations.
We then look at the implications for the so-called “marketability discount for controlling interests.” We look at this “discount” from the vantage points of the definition of fair market value, the integrated theory of business valuation, and recurring and incorrect rationales for the discount.
Are you a business appraiser or other professional looking for a comprehensive resource to keep you informed on the major factors affecting the U.S. economy and one you can include in your work product? Look no further than National Economic Review. It was, and remains, the only regularly published economic review that is written by valuation analysts for valuation analysts. As a bonus when subscribing, you get access to almost 40 years of historical issues. Learn more about the National Economic Review and how to subscribe in this post.
I have heard many appraisers suggest that one should not normalize owner compensation when valuing minority interests “because the minority shareholder cannot change compensation.” I’d like to address this issue in this post.
